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Abstract. Defined by Gelfond in 1991 (G91), epistemic specifications
(or programs) are an extension of logic programming under stable mod-
els semantics that introduces subjective literals. A subjective literal al-
lows checking whether some regular literal is true in all (or in some of)
the stable models of the program, being those models collected in a set
called world view. One epistemic program may yield several world views
but, under the original G91 semantics, some of them resulted from self-
supported derivations. During the last eight years, several alternative
approaches have been proposed to get rid of these self-supported world
views. Unfortunately, their success could only be measured by studying
their behaviour on a set of common examples in the literature, since
no formal property of “self-supportedness” had been defined. To fill this
gap, we extend in this paper the idea of unfounded set from standard
logic programming to the epistemic case. We define when a world view
is founded with respect to some program and propose the foundedness
property for any semantics whose world views are always founded. Using
counterexamples, we explain that the previous approaches violate found-
edness, and proceed to propose a new semantics based on a combination
of Moore’s Autoepistemic Logic and Pearce’s Equilibrium Logic. The
main result proves that this new semantics precisely captures the set of
founded G91 world views.
1 Introduction
The language of epistemic specifications, proposed by Gelfond in 1991 [4], extends
disjunctive logic programs (under the stable model [6] semantics) with modal
constructs called subjective literals. Using these constructs, it is possible to check
whether a regular literal l is true in every stable model (written K l) or in some
stable model (written M l) of the program. For instance, the rule:
a← ¬K b (1)
means that a must hold if we cannot prove that all the stable models contain b.
Subjective literals have been incorporated as an extension of the Answer Set
Programming (ASP) paradigm [14,18] in different solvers and implementations
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– see [12] for a recent survey. The definition of a “satisfactory” semantics for
epistemic specifications has proved to be a non-trivial enterprise, as shown by the
list of different attempts proposed so far [2,4,5,9,23,24,25]. The main difficulty
arises because subjective literals query the set of stable models but, at the same
time, occur in rules that determine those stable models. As an example, the
program consisting of:
b← ¬K a (2)
and (1) has now two rules defining atoms a and b in terms of the presence of those
same atoms in all the stable models. To solve this kind of cyclic interdependence,
the original semantics by Gelfond [4] (G91) considered different alternative world
views or sets of stable models. In the case of program (1)-(2), G91 yields two
alternative world views3, [{a}] and [{b}], each one containing a single stable
model, and this is also the behaviour obtained in the remaining approaches
developed later on. The feature that made G91 unconvincing, though, was the
generation of self-supported world views. A prototypical example for this effect
is the epistemic program consisting of the single rule:
a← K a (3)
whose world views under G91 are [∅] and [{a}]. The latter is considered as
counter-intuitive by all authors4 because it relies on a self-supported derivation:
a is derived fromK a by rule (3), but the only way to obtainK a is rule (3) itself.
Although the rejection of world views of this kind seems natural, the truth is
that all approaches in the literature have concentrated on studying the effects
on individual examples, rather than capturing the absence of self-supportedness
as a formal property. To achieve such a goal, we would need to establish some
kind of derivability condition in a very similar fashion as done with unfounded
sets [3] for standard logic programs. To understand the similarity, think about
the (tautological) rule a← a. The classical models of this rule are ∅ and {a}, but
the latter cannot be a stable model because a is not derivable applying the rule.
Intuitively, an unfounded set is a collection of atoms that is not derivable from
a given program and a fixed set of assumptions, as happens to {a} in the last
example. As proved by [13], the stable models of any disjuntive logic program
are precisely its classical models that are founded, that is, that do not admit any
unfounded set. As we can see, the situation in (3) is pretty similar to a← a but,
this time, involves derivability through subjective literals. An immediate option
is, therefore, extending the definition of unfounded sets for the case of epistemic
programs – this constitutes, indeed, the first contribution of this paper.
Once the property of founded world views is explicitly stated, the paper pro-
poses a new semantics for epistemic specifications, called Founded Autoepistemic
3 For the sake of readability, sets of propositional interpretations are embraced with
[ ] rather than { }.
4 This includes Gelfond himself, who proposed a new variant in [5] motivated by this
same example and further modified this variant later on in [9].
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Equilibrium Logic (FAEEL), that fulfills that requirement. In the spirit of [2,25],
our proposal actually constitutes a full modal non-monotonic logic where K be-
comes the usual necessity operator applicable to arbitrary formulas. Formally,
FAEEL is a combination of Pearce’s Equilibrium Logic [20], a well-known logical
characterisation of stable models, with Moore’s Autoepistemic Logic (AEL) [17],
one of the most representative approaches among modal non-monotonic logics.
The reason for choosing Equilibrium Logic is quite obvious, as it has proved its
utility for characterising other extensions of ASP, including the already men-
tioned epistemic approaches in [2,25]. As for the choice of AEL, it shares with
epistemic specifications the common idea of agent’s introspection where Kϕ
means that ϕ is one of the agent’s beliefs. The only difference is that those be-
liefs are just classical models in the case of AEL whereas epistemic specifications
deal with stable models instead. Interestingly, the problem of self-supported
models has also been extensively studied in AEL [11,15,19,21], where the for-
mula K a → a, analogous to (3), also yields an unfounded world view5 [{a}].
Our solution consists in combining the monotonic bases of AEL and Equilib-
rium Logic (the modal logic KD45 and the intermediate logic of Here-and-There
(HT) [8], respectively), but defining a two-step models selection criterion that
simultaneously keeps the agent’s beliefs as stable models and avoids unfounded
world views from the use of the modal operator K. As expected, we prove that
FAEEL guarantees the property of founded world views, among other features.
Our main result, however, goes further and asserts that the FAEEL world views
of an epistemic program are precisely the set of founded G91 world views. We
reach, in this way, an analogous situation to the case of standard logic pro-
gramming, where stable models are the set of founded classical models of the
program.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 and 3 respectively
revisit the background knowledge about equilibrium logic and epistemic specifi-
cations necessary for the rest of the paper. Section 4 introduces the foundedness
property for epistemic logic programs. In Section 5, we introduce FAEEL and
show that its world views precisely coincide with the set of founded G91 world
views. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Background
We begin recalling the basic definitions of equilibrium logic and its relation to
stable models. We start from the syntax of propositional logic, with formulas
built from combinations of atoms in a set AT with operators ∧,∨,⊥ and → in
the usual way. We define the derived operators ϕ ↔ ψ def= (ϕ → ψ) ∧ (ψ → ϕ),
(ϕ← ψ) def= (ψ → ϕ), ¬ϕ def= (ϕ→ ⊥) and ⊤ def= ¬⊥.
A propositional interpretation T is a set of atoms T ⊆ AT . We write T |= ϕ
to represent that T classically satisfies formula ϕ. An HT-interpretation is a pair
〈H,T 〉 (respectively called “here” and “there”) of propositional interpretations
5 Technically, AEL is defined in terms of theory expansions but each one can be char-
acterised by a canonical S5-model with the same form of a world view [16,22].
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such that H ⊆ T ⊆ AT ; it is said to be total when H = T . We write 〈H,T 〉 |= ϕ
to represent that 〈H,T 〉 satisfies a formula ϕ under the recursive conditions:
– 〈H,T 〉 6|= ⊥
– 〈H,T 〉 |= p iff p ∈ H
– 〈H,T 〉 |= ϕ ∧ ψ iff 〈H,T 〉 |= ϕ and 〈H,T 〉 |= ψ
– 〈H,T 〉 |= ϕ ∨ ψ iff 〈H,T 〉 |= ϕ or 〈H,T 〉 |= ψ
– 〈H,T 〉 |= ϕ→ ψ iff both (i) T |= ϕ→ ψ and (ii) 〈H,T 〉 6|= ϕ or 〈H,T 〉 |= ψ
As usual, we say that 〈H,T 〉 is a model of a theory Γ , in symbols 〈H,T 〉 |= Γ , iff
〈H,T 〉 |= ϕ for all ϕ ∈ Γ . It is easy to see that 〈T, T 〉 |= Γ iff T |= Γ classically.
For this reason, we will identify 〈T, T 〉 simply as T and will use ‘|=’ indistinctly.
By CL[Γ ] we denote the set of all classical models of Γ . Interpretation 〈T, T 〉 = T
is a stable (or equilibrium) model of a theory Γ iff T |= Γ and there is no H ⊂ T
such that 〈H,T 〉 |= Γ . We write SM[Γ ] to stand for the set of all stable models
of Γ . Note that SM[Γ ] ⊆ CL[Γ ] by definition.
3 G91 semantics for epistemic theories
In this section we provide a straightforward generalisation of G91 allowing its
application to arbitrary modal theories. Formulas are extended with the necessity
operator K according to the following grammar:
ϕ ::= ⊥ | a | ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 | ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2 | ϕ1 → ϕ2 | Kϕ for any atom a ∈ AT .
An (epistemic) theory is a set of formulas as defined above. In our context, the
epistemic reading ofKψ is that “ψ is one of the agent’s beliefs.” Thus, a formula
ϕ is said to be subjective if all its atom occurrences (having at least one) are in
the scope of K. Analogously, ϕ is said to be objective if K does not occur in ϕ.
For instance, ¬K a ∨K b is subjective, ¬a ∨ b is objective and ¬a ∨K b none of
the two.
To represent the agent’s beliefs we will use a set W of propositional interpre-
tations. We call belief set to each element I ∈ W and belief view to the whole
set W. The difference between belief and knowledge is that the former may not
hold in the real world. Thus, satisfaction of formulas will be defined with respect
to an interpretation I ⊆ AT , possibly I 6∈ W, that accounts for the real world:
the pair (W, I) is called belief interpretation (or interpretation in modal logic
KD45). Modal satisfaction is also written (W, I) |= ϕ (ambiguity is removed by
the interpretation on the left) and follows the conditions:
– (W, I) 6|= ⊥,
– (W, I) |= a iff a ∈ I, for any atom a ∈ AT ,
– (W, I) |= ψ1 ∧ ψ2 iff (W, I) |= ψ1 and (W, I) |= ψ2,
– (W, I) |= ψ1 ∨ ψ2 iff (W, I) |= ψ1 or (W, I) |= ψ2,
– (W, I) |= ψ1 → ψ2 iff (W, I) 6|= ψ1 or (W, I) |= ψ2, and
– (W, I) |= Kψ iff (W, J) |= ψ for all J ∈W.
Notice that implication here is classical, that is, ϕ→ ψ is equivalent to ¬ϕ∨ψ in
this context. A belief interpretation (W, I) is a belief model of Γ iff (W, J) |= ϕ
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for all ϕ ∈ Γ and all J ∈ W ∪ {I} – additionally, when I ∈ W, we further say
that W is an epistemic model of Γ and abbreviate this as W |= Γ . Belief models
defined in this way correspond to modal logic KD45 whereas epistemic models
correspond to S5.
Example 1. Take the theory Γ1 = {¬K b → a} corresponding to rule (1). An
epistemic model W |= Γ1 must satisfy: 〈W, J〉 |= K b or 〈W, J〉 |= a, for all
J ∈ W. We get three epistemic models from K b, [{b}], [{a, b}], and [{b}, {a, b}]
and the rest of cases must force a true, so we also get [{a}] and [{a}, {a, b}]. In
other words, Γ1 has the same epistemic models than K b ∨K a. ⊓⊔
Note that rule (1) alone did not seem to provide any reason for believing b, but we
got three epistemic models above satisfying K b. Thus, we will be interested only
in some epistemic models (we will call world views) that minimize the agent’s
beliefs in some sense. To define such a minimisation we rely on the following
syntactic transformation provided by [24].
Definition 1 (Subjective reduct). The subjective reduct of a theory Γ with
respect to a belief view W, also written ΓW, is obtained by replacing each maximal
subformula of the form Kϕ by: ⊤, if W |= Kϕ; by ⊥, otherwise. Notice that
ΓW is a classical, non-modal theory. ⊓⊔
Finally, we impose a fixpoint condition where, depending on whether each belief
set I ∈W is required to be a stable model of the reduct or just a classical model,
we get G91 or AEL semantics, respectively.
Definition 2 (AEL and G91 world views). A belief view W is called an
AEL-world view of a theory Γ iff W = CL[ΓW], and is called a G91-world view
of Γ iff W = SM[ΓW]. ⊓⊔
Example 2 (Example 1 revisited). Take any W such that W |= K b. Then, ΓW1 =
{⊥ → a} with CL[ΓW1 ] = [∅, {a}, {b}, {a, b}] and SM[Γ
W
1 ] = [∅]. None of the two
satisfy K b so W cannot be fixpoint for G91 or AEL. If W 6|= K b instead, we
get ΓW1 = {⊤ → a}, whose classical models are {a} and {a, b}, but only the
former is stable. As a result, W = [{a}, {a, b}] is the unique AEL world view and
W = [{a}] the unique G91 world view. ⊓⊔
Example 3. Take now the theory Γ3 = {K a → a} corresponding to rule (3). If
W |= K a we get ΓW3 = {⊤ → a} and CL[Γ
W
3 ] = SM[Γ
W
3 ] = {a} so W = [{a}] is
an AEL and G91 world view. If W 6|= K a, the reduct becomes ΓW3 = {⊥ → a},
a classical tautology with unique stable model ∅. As a result, W = [∅, {a}] is the
other AEL world view, while W = [∅] is the a second G91 world view. ⊓⊔
As we can see, the difference between AEL and G91 is that we use classical
CL[ΓW] instead of stable SM[ΓW] models, respectively. It is well known that
adding the excluded middle axiom a ∨ ¬a for all atoms makes equilibrium logic
collapse into classical logic. This leads us to the following result.
Theorem 1. W is an AEL world view of some theory Γ iff W is a G91-world
view of Γ ∪ {a ∨ ¬a | a ∈ AT }. ⊓⊔
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4 Founded world views of epistemic specifications
As we explained in the introduction, world view [{a}] of {K a→ a} is considered
to be “self-supported” in the literature but, unfortunately, there is no formal
definition for such a concept, to the best of our knowledge. To cover this lack,
we proceed to extend here the idea of unfounded sets from disjunctive logic
programs to the epistemic case. For this purpose, we focus next on the original
language of epistemic specifications [4] (a fragment of epistemic theories closer
to logic programs) on which most approaches have been actually defined.
Let us start by introducing some terminology. An objective literal is either
an atom a ∈ AT , its negation ¬a or its double negation ¬¬a. A subjective literal
is any of the formulas6 K l, ¬K l or ¬¬K l where l an objective literal. A literal
is either an objective or a subjective literal, and is called negative if it contains
negation and positive otherwise. A rule is a formula of the form
a1 ∨ . . . ∨ an ← B1 ∧ . . . ∧Bm (4)
with n ≥ 0, m ≥ 0 and m + n > 0, where each ai is an atom and each Bj
is a literal. For any rule r like (4), we define its body as Body(r) def= B1 ∧
. . . ∧ Bm and its head Head(r)
def= a1 ∨ . . . ∨ an, which we sometimes use as
the set of atoms {a1, . . . , an}. When n = 0, Head(r) = ⊥ and the rule is a
constraint, whereas if m = 0 then Body(r) = ⊤ and the rule is a fact. The set
Body+ob(r) collects all atoms occurring in positive objective literals in the body
while Body+sub(r) collects all atoms occurring in positive subjective literals. An
epistemic specification or program is a set of rules. As with formulas, a program
without occurrences of K is said to be objective (it corresponds to a standard
disjunctive logic program with double negation).
Definition 3 (Unfounded set). Let Π be a program and W a belief view. An
unfounded set S with respect to Π and W is a non-empty set of pairs where, for
each 〈X, I〉 ∈ S, we have that X and I are sets of atoms and there is no rule
r ∈ Π with Head(r) ∩X 6= ∅ satisfying:
1. (W, I) |= Body(r)
2. Body+ob(r) ∩X = ∅
3. (Head(r) \X) ∩ I = ∅
4. Body+sub(r) ∩ Y = ∅ with Y =
⋃
{ X ′ | 〈X ′, I ′〉 ∈ S }. ⊓⊔
The definition works in a similar way to standard unfounded sets [13, Defini-
tion 3.1]. In fact, the latter corresponds to the first three conditions above, except
that we use (W, I) to check Body(r), as it may contain now subjective literals.
Intuitively, each I represents some potential belief set (or stable model) and X
is some set of atoms without a “justifying” rule, that is, there is no r ∈ Π al-
lowing a positive derivation of atoms in X . A rule like that should have a true
6 We focus here on the study of the operator K, but epistemic specifications also allow
a second operator M l whose relation to K is also under debate and, for this reason,
we leave it future work.
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Body(r) (condition 1) but not because of positive literals in X (condition 2) and
is not used to derive other head atoms outside X (condition 3). The novelty
in our definition is the addition of condition 4: to consider r a justifying rule,
we additionally require not using any positive literal K a in the body such that
atom a also belongs to any of the unfounded components X ′ in S.
Definition 4 (Founded world view). Let Π be a program and W be a belief
view. We say that W is unfounded if there is some unfounded-set S s.t., for every
〈X, I〉 ∈ S, we have I ∈W and X ∩ I 6= ∅. W is called founded otherwise. ⊓⊔
When Π is an objective program, each pair 〈X, I〉 corresponds to a standard
unfounded set X of some potential stable model I in the traditional sense of [13].
Example 4. Given the single disjunctive rule a ∨ b suppose we check the (ex-
pected) world view W = [{a}, {b}]. For I = {a} and X = {a}, rule a∨ b satisfies
the four conditions and justifies a. The same happens for I = {b} = X . So, W
is founded. However, suppose we try with W′ = [{a, b}] instead. For I = {a, b}
we can form X = {a} and X ′ = {b} and in both cases, the only rule in the
program, a∨ b, violates condition 3. As a result, W′ is unfounded due to the set
S′ = {〈{b}, {a, b}〉, 〈{a}, {a, b}〉}. ⊓⊔
To illustrate how condition 4 works, let us continue with Example 3.
Example 5 (Example 3 continued). Theory Γ3 = {K a → a} is also a program.
Given belief set W = [{a}] we can observe that S = [〈{a}, {a}〉] makes W
unfounded because the unique rule in Γ3 does not fulfill condition 4: we cannot
derive a from a rule that contains a ∈ Body+sub(r). On the other hand, the other
G91 world view, W = [∅], is trivially founded. ⊓⊔
Since Definition 4 only depends on some epistemic program and its selected
world views, we can raise it to a general property for any epistemic semantics.
Property 1 (Foundedness). A semantics satisfies foundedness when all the world
views it assigns to any program Π are founded. ⊓⊔
Approaches proposed after G91 do remove unfounded world views in the
examples studied in the literature, but unfortunately, this does not mean that
they generally satisfy foundedness. Let us consider a common counterexample.
Example 6. Take the epistemic logic program:
a ∨ b a← K b b← K a (Π1)
whose G91-world views are W = [{a}, {b}] and W′ = [{a, b}]. These are, indeed,
the two cases we analysed in Example 4. W is again founded because a ∨ b
keeps justifying both possible 〈X, I〉 pairs, that is, [〈{a}, {a}〉] and [〈{b}, {b}〉].
However, for W′ we still have the unfounded set S′ = [〈{a}, {a, b}〉, 〈{b}, {a, b}〉]
which violates condition 3 for the first rule as before, but also condition 4 for
the other two rules. ⊓⊔
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Note how S′ allows us to spot the root of the derivability problem: to justify a in
〈{a}, {a, b}〉 we cannot use a← K b because b is part of the unfounded structure
X in the other pair 〈{b}, {a, b}〉, and vice versa. Since the variants by Gelfond
in [5] (G11) and Kahl et al. [9] (K15) also assign the unfounded world view W′
to Π1 (in fact, they coincide with G91 for this program), we can conclude that
G11 and K15 do not satisfy foundedness either.
A more elaborated strategy is adopted by the recent approaches by Farin˜as et
al. [2] (F15) and Shen and Eiter [23] (S17), that treat the previous world views
as candidate solutions7, but select the ones with minimal knowledge in a second
step. This allows removing the unfounded world view [{a, b}] in Example 6,
because the other solution [{a}, {b}] provides less knowledge. Unfortunately, this
strategy does not suffice to guarantee foundedness, since other formulas (such
as constraints) may remove the founded world view, as explained below.
Example 7 (Example 6 continued). Take the program Π2 = Π1 ∪ {⊥ ← ¬K a}.
The constraint rules out W = [{a}, {b}] because the latter satisfies ¬K a. In
G91, G11, F15 and S17, only world view W′ = [{a, b}] is left, so knowledge
minimisation has no effect. However,W′ is still unfounded inΠ2 since constraints
do not affect that feature (their empty head never justifies any atom). ⊓⊔
As a conclusion, semantics F15 and S17 do not satisfy foundedness either.
5 Founded Autoepistemic Equilibrium Logic
We present now the semantics proposed in this paper, introducing Founded Au-
toepistemic Equilibrium Logic (FAEEL). The basic idea is an elaboration of the
belief (or KD45) interpretation (W, I) already seen but replacing belief sets by
HT pairs. Thus, we extend now the idea of belief view W to a non-empty set of
HT-interpretations W = {〈H1, T1〉, . . . , 〈Hn, Tn〉} and say that W is total when
Hi = Ti for all of them, coinciding with the form of belief viewsW = {T1, . . . , Tn}
we had so far. Similarly, a belief interpretation is now redefined as (W, 〈H,T 〉),
or simply (W, H, T ), where W is a belief view and 〈H,T 〉 stands for the real
world, possibly not in W. Next, we redefine the satisfaction relation from a com-
bination of modal logic KD45 and HT. A belief interpretation I = (W, H, T )
satisfies a formula ϕ, written I |= ϕ, iff:
– I 6|= ⊥,
– I |= a iff a ∈ H , for any atom a ∈ AT ,
– I |= ψ1 ∧ ψ2 iff I |= ψ1 and I |= ψ2,
– I |= ψ1 ∨ ψ2 iff I |= ψ1 or I |= ψ2,
– I |= ψ1 → ψ2 iff both: (i) I 6|= ψ1 or I |= ψ2; and (ii) (Wt, T ) 6|= ψ1 or
(Wt, T ) |= ψ2, where Wt = {Ti | 〈Hi, Ti〉 ∈W}.
– I |= Kψ iff (W, Hi, Ti) |= ψ for all 〈Hi, Ti〉 ∈W.
7 In [2], these candidate world views are called epistemic equilibrium models while
selected world views receive the name of autoepistemic equilibrium models.
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For total belief interpretations, this new satisfaction relation collapses to the one
in Section 3 (that is, KD45). Interpretation (W, H, T ) is a belief model of Γ iff
(W, Hi, Ti) |= ϕ for all 〈Hi, Ti〉 ∈ W ∪ {〈H,T 〉} and all ϕ ∈ Γ – additionally,
when 〈H,T 〉 ∈W, we further say thatW is an epistemic model of Γ , abbreviated
as W |= Γ .
Proposition 1 (Persistence). (W, H, T ) |= ϕ implies (Wt, T ) |= ϕ. ⊓⊔
A belief model just captures collections of HT models which need not be in
equilibrium. To make the agent’s beliefs correspond to stable models we impose
a particular minimisation criterion on belief models.
Definition 5. We define the partial order I ′  I for belief interpretations I ′ =
(W′, H ′, T ′) and I = (W, H, T ) when the following three conditions hold:
1. T ′ = T and H ′ ⊆ H, and
2. for every 〈Hi, Ti〉 ∈W, there is some 〈H ′i , Ti〉 ∈W
′, with H ′i ⊆ Hi.
3. for every 〈H ′i , Ti〉 ∈W
′, there is some 〈Hi, Ti〉 ∈W, with H ′i ⊆ Hi. ⊓⊔
As usual, I ′ ≺ I means I ′  I and I ′ 6= I. The intuition for I ′  I is that I ′
contains less information than I for each fixed Ti component. As a result, I ′ |= ϕ
implies I |= ϕ for any formula ϕ without implications other than ¬ψ = ψ → ⊥.
Definition 6. A total belief interpretation I = (W, T ) is said to be an equilib-
rium belief model of some theory Γ iff I is a belief model of Γ and there is no
other belief model I ′ of Γ such that I ′ ≺ I. ⊓⊔
By EQB[Γ ] we denote the set of equilibrium belief models of Γ . As a final step,
we impose a fixpoint condition to minimise the agent’s knowledge as follows.
Definition 7. A belief view W is called an equilibrium world view of Γ iff:
W = { T | (W, T ) ∈ EQB[Γ ] } ⊓⊔
Example 8 (Example 5 continued). Back to Γ3 = {K a→ a}, remember its unique
founded G91-world view was [∅]. It is easy to see that I = ([∅], ∅) ∈ EQB[Γ3]
because ([∅], ∅) |= Γ3 and no smaller belief model can be obtained. More-
over, [∅] is an equilibrium world view of Γ3 since no other T 6∈ [∅] satisfies
([∅], T ) ∈ EQB[Γ3]. The only possibility is ([∅], {a}) but it fails because there
is a smaller belief model ([∅], ∅, {a}) satisfying K a→ a. As for the other poten-
tial world view [{a}], it is not in equilibrium: we already have I ′ = ([{a}], {a}) 6∈
EQB[Γ3] because the smaller interpretation I
′′ = ([〈∅, {a}〉], {a}, {a}) also satis-
fies Γ3. In particular, note that I
′′ 6|= K a and, thus, clearly satisfiesK a→ a. ⊓⊔
The logic induced by equilibrium world views is called Founded Autoepistemic
Equilibrium Logic (FAEEL). A first important property is:
Theorem 2. FAEEL satisfies foundedness. ⊓⊔
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A second interesting feature is that equilibrium world views are also G91-
world views though the converse may not be the case (as we just saw in Exam-
ple 8). This holds, not only for programs, but in general for any theory:
Theorem 3. For any theory Γ , its equilibrium world views are also G91-world
views of Γ . ⊓⊔
In other words, FAEEL is strictly stronger than G91, something that, as we
see next, is not the case in other approaches in the literature.
Example 9. The following program:
a ∨ b c← K a ⊥ ← ¬c (Π3)
has no G91-world views, but according to G11, K15, F15 and S17 has world
view [{a, c}]. This example was also used in [1] to show that these semantics do
not satisfy another property, called there epistemic splitting. ⊓⊔
Example 10 (Example 6 continued). Take again program Π1 whose G91-world
views were W = [{a}, {b}] and W′ = [{a, b}]. Since W′ is unfounded, it cannot
be an equilibrium world view (Theorem 2), leaving W as the only candidate
(Theorem 3). Let us check that this is in fact an equilibrium world view. First,
note that I = ([{a}, {b}], {a}) ∈ EQB[Π1] because there is no model I
′ of Π1
such that I ′  I. In fact, it is easy to see that ([〈H1, {a}〉, 〈H2, {b}〉], H3, {a}) is
not a model of the rule a ∨ b if Hi = ∅ for any i ∈ {1, 2, 3}. Symmetrically, we
have that I ′ = ([{a}, {b}], {b}) ∈ EQB[Π1] too. Finally, we have to check that
no other T 6∈ [{a}, {b}] can form an equilibrium belief model. For the case T = ∅,
it is easy to check that ([{a}, {b}], ∅) does not satisfy a ∨ b. For T = {a, b}, we
have that I ′′ = ([{a}, {b}], {a, b}) 6∈ EQB[Π1] because, for instance, the smaller
I ′′′ = ([{a}, {b}], {a}, {a, b}) is a model of Π1. ⊓⊔
Theorems 2 and 3 assert that any equilibrium world view is a founded G91-
world view. The natural question is whether the opposite also holds. In Exam-
ples 8, 9 and 10 we did not find any counterexample, and this is in fact a general
property, as stated below.
Main Theorem. Given any program Π, its equilibrium world views coincide
with its founded G91-world views. ⊓⊔
An interesting observation is that in all the original examples of epistemic
specifications [4,7] used by Gelfond to introduce G91, modal operators occurred
in the scope of negation. Negated beliefs never incur unfoundedness, so this
feature could not be spotted using this family of examples. In fact, under this
syntactic restriction, FAEEL and G91 coincide.
Proposition 2. For any theory where all occurrences of K are in the scope
of negation, we have that the equilibrium world views and the G91-world views
coincide. ⊓⊔
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program world views
a ∨ b [{a}, {b}]
a ∨ b
[{a}, {b}]
a← K b
a ∨ b
[{a}]
a← ¬K b
a ∨ b
[{a, c}, {b, c}]
c← ¬K b
a← ¬K b
[{a}] , [{b}]
b← ¬K a
a← ¬K¬a
[{a}]
a← ¬K a
program G91/G11/FAEEL K15/F15/S17
a← ¬K¬a [∅] , [{a}] [{a}]
a ∨ b
none [{a}]
a← ¬K¬b
a ∨ b
[{a}] , [{a}, {b}] [{a}, {b}]
a← K¬b
a← b
[∅] , [{a, b}] [{a, b}]
b← ¬K¬a
a← ¬K¬b
[∅] , [{a}, {b}] [{a}, {b}]
b← ¬K¬a
Fig. 1. On the left, examples where G91, G11, K15, F15, S17 and FAEEL agree. On
the right, examples where FAEEL/G91/G11 differ from K15/F15/S17.
Proposition 2 also holds for semantics [24,25] that are conservative extensions
of G91, as well as for G11. Apart from foundedness, [1] recently proposed other
four properties for semantics of epistemic specifications. We analyse here three
of them, omitting the so-called epistemic splitting due to lack of space.
1. supra-ASP holds when, for any objective theory Γ , either Γ has a unique
world view W = SM[Γ ] 6= ∅ or SM[Γ ] = ∅ and Γ has no world view.
2. supra-S5 holds when every world view W of a theory Γ is also an S5-model
of Γ (that is, W |= Γ ).
3. subjective constraint monotonicity holds when, for any theory Γ and any
subjective constraint ⊥ ← ϕ, we have that W is a world view of Γ ∪{⊥ ← ϕ}
iff both W is a world view of Γ and W is not an S5-model of ϕ.
Proposition 3. FAEEL satisfies supra-ASP, supra-S5 and subjective constraint
monotonicity. ⊓⊔
All semantics discussed in this paper satisfy the above first two properties but
most of them fail for subjective constraint monotonicity, as first discussed in [10].
In fact, a variation of Example 9 can be used to show that K15, F15 and S17 do
not satisfy this property.
Example 11 (Example 9 continued). Suppose we remove the constraint (last
rule) from Π3 getting the program Π4 = {a ∨ b , c ← K a}. All semantics,
including G91 and FAEEL, agree that Π4 has a unique world view [{a}, {b}].
Suppose we add now a subjective constraint Π5 = Π4 ∪ {⊥ ← ¬K c}. This ad-
dition leaves G91 and FAEEL without world views (due to subjective constraint
monotonicity) the same happens for G11, but not for K15, F15 and S17, which
provide a new world view [{a, c}] not obtained before adding the subjective con-
straint. ⊓⊔
Tables 1 and 2 show a list of examples taken from Table 4 in [2] and their
world views according to different semantics.
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program G91 G11/FAEEL K15 F15/S17
a← ¬K¬b ∧ ¬b
[∅] , [{a}, {b}] [{a}, {b}]
b← ¬K¬a ∧ ¬a
a← K a [∅] , [{a}] [∅]
a← K a
[{a}] none
a← ¬K a
Fig. 2. Examples splitting different semantics. Examples 6 and 9 in the paper can be
used to further split FAEEL and G11.
6 Conclusions
In order to characterise self-supported world-views, already present in Gelfond’s
1991 semantics [4] (G91), we have extended the definition of unfounded sets from
standard logic programs to epistemic specifications. As a result, we proposed
the foundedness property for epistemic semantics, which is not satisfied by other
approaches in the literature. Our main contribution has been the definition of a
new semantics, based on the so-called Founded Autoepistemic Equilibrium Logic
(FAEEL), that satisfies foundedness. This semantics actually covers the syntax
of any arbitrary modal theory and is a combination of Equilibrium Logic and
Autoepistemic Logic. As a main result, we were able to prove that, for the syntax
of epistemic specifications, FAEEL world views coincide with the set of G91
world views that are founded. We showed how this semantics behaves on a set of
common examples in the literature and proved that it satisfies other three basic
properties: all world views are S5 models (supra-S5 ); standard programs have
(at most) a unique world view containing all the stable models (supra-ASP);
and subjective constraints just remove world views (monotonicity). FAEEL also
satisfies the property of epistemic splitting as proposed in [1], but we leave the
proof and discussion for future work, together with a formal comparison with
other approaches.
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A Proof of Proposition 1
Proof of Proposition 1. Just note that, for atomic a, we have that 〈W, H, T 〉 |=
a iff a ∈ H ⊆ T which implies that 〈Wt, T 〉 |= a. The rest of the proof follows
by induction in the structure of ϕ. ⊓⊔
B Proof of Theorem 2
The proof of Theorem 2 rely on the definition of S5-equilibrium models. We
first show that S5-equilibrium models are unfounded-free and then that au-
toepistemic world views are S5-equilibrium models. Then, we obtain that au-
toepistemic world views are unfounded-free as a corollary. We start by defining
S5-interpretations W as sets of HT-interpretations. An S5-interpretations W is
said to be total iff it satisfies that every HT-interpretation 〈H,T 〉 ∈ W is to-
tal, that is, H = T . We say that an S5-interpretations W is a S5HT-model of a
formula ϕ iff 〈W, H, T 〉 |= ϕ for every 〈H,T 〉 ∈W.
Definition 8. Given S5-interpretations W1 and W2, we write W1 W2 iff the
following two condition hold:
1. for every 〈H2, T 〉 ∈W2, there is some 〈H1, T 〉 ∈W1, with H1 ⊆ H2.
2. for every 〈H1, T 〉 ∈W1, there is some 〈H2, T 〉 ∈W2, with H1 ⊆ H2.
As usual, we write W1 ≺W2 iff W1 W2 and W1 6= W2. ⊓⊔
Definition 9. A total S5-interpretation W is said to be a S5-equilibrium model
of some theory Γ iff W is a S5HT-model of Γ and there is no other S5HT-model W
′
of Γ such that W′ ≺W. ⊓⊔
S5-equilibrium model are similar to epistemic equilibrium model in the sense
of [2], being the major difference that, in our approach, different evaluations in
the here world can be used to minimise the same evaluation in the there world.
As a result, we conjeture that every S5-equilibrium model is also an epistemic
equilibrium model in the sense of [2]. On the other hand, the converse does
not hold in general. For instance, if we take the program Π1 from Example 6,
we have that [{a}, {b}] is an epistemic equilibrium model in the sense of [2],
but not an S5-equilibrium model in our approach. This shows that epistemic
equilibrium model in the sense of [2] are not unfounded-free (in the same way
that world views or autoepistemic equilibrium model in this approach are not
unfounded-free). The following result shows that S5-equilibrium model are, in
fact, unfounded-free.
Theorem 4. Any S5-equilibrium model of any program Π is unfounded-free. ⊓⊔
Proof. Let W be some S5-equilibrium model of some program Π and suppose,
for the sake of contradiction, that it is not unfounded-free. Then, there is a
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unfounded-set S for Π with respect to W such that, for every 〈X, I〉 ∈ S, we
have I ∈W and X ∩ I 6= ∅. Let
W
′ = { 〈I, I〉 | 〈I, I〉 ∈W and no 〈X, I〉 /∈ S }
∪ { 〈I \X, I〉 | 〈I, I〉 ∈W and 〈X, I〉 ∈ S }
Since S is non-empty and X∩I 6= ∅ for all 〈X, I〉 ∈ S, we have that W′ ≺W and,
sinceW is an S5-equilibriummodel ofΠ , it must be thatW′ is not an S5HT-model
of Π . Hence, there is some rule r ∈ Π such that W is an S5HT-model of r while
W′ is not. Besides, the latter implies that there is some 〈H,T 〉 ∈ W′ such that
〈W′, H, T 〉 6|= r and, thus, that one of following conditions must hold:
1. 〈W′, H, T 〉 |=
∧
Body(r) and 〈W′, H, T 〉 6|=
∨
Head(r), or
2. 〈W, T, T 〉 |=
∧
Body(r) and 〈W, T, T 〉 6|=
∨
Head(r).
Note that the latter is a contradiction with the fact that W is an S5HT-model
of r and, thus, the former must hold. Furthermore, 〈W′, H, T 〉 |=
∧
Body(r)
implies 〈W, T 〉 |=
∧
Body(r) and, since W is an S5HT-model of r, that 〈W, T 〉 |=∨
Head(r). Hence, Head(r)∩H = ∅ and there is an atom a ∈ Head(r) such that
a ∈ T \H . By construction, this implies that, since 〈X,T 〉 ∈ S with X = T \H
and, thus, one of the following conditions must hold:
1. (W,T ) 6|=
∧
Body(r),
2. Body+ob(r) ∩X 6= ∅, or
3. (Head(r) \X) ∩ T 6= ∅, or
4. Body+sub(r) ∩ Y 6= ∅.
The first condition cannot hold because we have that 〈W, T 〉 |=
∧
Body(r).
Furthermore, X = T \H , we have that
(Head(r) \X) ∩ T 6= ∅ holds
iff (Head(r) \ (T \H)) ∩ T 6= ∅
iff (Head(r) ∩ (T ∩H)) ∩ T 6= ∅
iff (Head(r) ∩ (T ∪H)) ∩ T 6= ∅
iff Head(r) ∩ T ∩ T 6= ∅ or Head(r) ∩H ∩ T 6= ∅
iff Head(r) ∩H 6= ∅
which does not hold. Hence, the forth condition cannot hold either.
Assume now that b ∈ Body+ob(r)∩X 6= ∅. Then, 〈W
′, H, T 〉 6|= b and, thus, we
have that 〈W′, H, T 〉 6|=
∧
Body(r) which is a contradiction with 1. Therefore, it
must be that Body+sub(r)∩Y 6= ∅ holds. Pick some atom b ∈ Body
+
sub(r) ∩ Y . But
then, there is some 〈X ′, T ′〉 ∈ S such that b ∈ X ′ and 〈H ′, T ′〉 ∈ W with X ′ =
T ′\H ′. This implies that 〈W′, H ′, T ′〉 6|= b and, thus, that 〈W′, H, T 〉 6|= K b which
is a contradiction with the fact that 〈W′, H, T 〉 |=
∧
Body(r). Consequently, W
must be unfounded-free. ⊓⊔
Observation 1. Let Γ be a theory and I = 〈W, H, T 〉 be a model of Γ . Then,
W is an S5HT-model of Γ . ⊓⊔
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Proposition 4. Let Γ be a theory and W be an S5-interpretation such that
〈W, T 〉 is a equilibrium model of Γ for every T ∈W. Then, W is an S5-equilibrium
model of Γ .
Proof. First note that, since 〈W, T 〉 is a equilibrium model of Γ for every T ∈
W, it follows that 〈W, T 〉 is a model of Γ for every T ∈ W and, thus, that
〈W, T 〉 |= ϕ for every formula ϕ ∈ Γ . In its turn, this implies that W is an
S5-model of Γ . Suppose now, for the sake of contradiction, that W is not an
S5-equilibrium model of Γ and, thus, that there is some S5HT-model W
′ of Γ
such that W′ ≺W. Hence, there is 〈H,T 〉 ∈W′ such that H ⊂ T . Furthermore,
since 〈W, T 〉 is a equilibrium model of Γ it follows that 〈W′, H, T 〉 is not a model
of Γ . Hence, there is a formula ϕ ∈ Γ and 〈H ′, T ′〉 ∈ W′ ∪ {〈H,T 〉} = W′ such
that 〈W′, H ′, T ′〉 6|= ϕ. This implies that W′ is not an S5HT-model of ϕ which is
a contradiction with the fact that W′ is an S5HT-model of Γ . Consequently, W
must be an S5-equilibrium model of Γ . ⊓⊔
Note that, in general, the converse of Proposition 4 does not hold. For in-
stance, [{a}] is the unique S5-equilibrium model of the the theory {K a} while
([{a}], {a}) is not a equilibrium model of it.
Corollary 1. Let W be an autoepistemic world view of some theory Γ . Then,
it satisfies the following two conditions:
1. W is an S5-equilibrium model, and
2. there is no propositional interpretation T such that model 〈W, T 〉 is an
equilibrium model of Γ and T /∈W. ⊓⊔
Note that, in general, the converse of Corollary 1 does not hold. For instance,
theory {K a,¬¬a} has no autoepistemic world view while we have that [{a}] is an
S5-equilibrium model and ([{a}], ∅) is not a equilibrium model of it. To see that
[{a}] is not autoepistemic world view, note that ([{a}], {a}) is not a equilibrium
model of {K a,¬¬a}.
Proof of Theorem 2. From Corollary 1, we have that W is an S5-equilibrium
model and, from Theorem 4, this implies that W is unfounded-free. ⊓⊔
C Proof of Theorem 3
The proof of Theorem 3 rely on the definition of weak autoepistemic world views.
We first show that every autoepistemic world view is also a weak autoepistemic
world view and then that weak autoepistemic world views coincide with G91-
world views. Then, we obtain that autoepistemic world views are G91-world
views as a corollary. Let us start by defining semi-total interpretations. We say
that an interpretation 〈W, H, T 〉 is semi-total iff every HT-interpretation 〈H ′, T ′〉 ∈
W is total, that is, H ′ = T ′. It is easy to see that, every total interpretation is
semi-total but not vice-versa.
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Definition 10. A total interpretation I is said to be a weak equilibrium model
of some theory Γ iff I is a model of Γ and there is no other semi-total model I ′
of Γ such that I ′ ≺ I. ⊓⊔
Note that every equilibrium model is also a weak equilibrium model, but not
vice-versa. For instance, ([{a}], {a}) is a weak equilibrium model of {a ← K a}
but not a equilibrium model.
Definition 11. A S5-interpretation W is called a weak autoepistemic world
view of Γ iff it satisfies the following two conditions:
1. (W, T ) is a weak equilibrium model of Γ for every T ∈W, and
2. there not exists any propositional interpretation T such that 〈W, T 〉 is a weak
equilibrium model of Γ and T /∈W. ⊓⊔
Proposition 5. Every autoepistemic world view is also a weak autoepistemic
world view. ⊓⊔
Proof. Since every equilibrium model is also a weak equilibrium model, it only
remains to be shown that if W is an autoepistemic world view then
there not exists any propositional interpretation T such that 〈W, T 〉 is a
weak equilibrium model of Γ and T /∈W.
Suppose, for the sake of contradiction, that there is some propositional interpre-
tation T such that 〈W, T 〉 is a weak equilibrium model of Γ and T /∈ W. Since
W is an autoepistemic world view, this implies that 〈W, T 〉 is not a equilibrium
model of Γ and, thus, that there is some non-semi-total model I ′ = 〈W′, H, T 〉
of Γ such that I ′ ≺ I. Hence, there is some 〈H ′, T ′〉 ∈ W′ such that H ′ ⊂ T ′.
Let I ′′ = 〈W′, H ′, T ′〉. Then, we have that I ′′ ≺ 〈W, T ′〉 and, since W is an au-
toepistemic world view of Γ and T ∈ W, we have that 〈W, T ′〉 is a equilibrium
model of Γ . These two facts together imply that I ′′ is not a model of Γ . Hence,
there is a formula ϕ ∈ Γ such that I ′′ is not a model of ϕ and, thus, there
is 〈H ′′, T ′′〉 ∈ W′ ∪ {〈H ′, T ′〉} such that 〈W′, H ′′, T ′′〉 6|= ϕ. On the other
hand, since I ′ is a model of Γ , it follows that 〈W′, H ′′′, T ′′′〉 6|= ϕ for every
〈H ′′′, T ′′′〉 ∈ W′ ∪ {〈H,T 〉}. Hence, it follows that H ′′ = H ′ and T ′′ = T ′
and that 〈W′, H ′, T ′〉 6|= ϕ. However, since 〈H ′, T ′〉 ∈ W′, this implies that
I ′ = 〈W′, H, T 〉 6|= ϕ, which is a contradiction with the fact that I ′ is a model
of Γ . Consequently, W is a weak autoepistemic world view. ⊓⊔
Lemma 1. Let Γ be a formula and I = 〈W, H, T 〉 be a semi-total interpretation.
Then, I is a model of ϕ iff I is a model of ϕW. ⊓⊔
Proof. Assume that ϕ = Kψ. Then, we have that 〈W, H ′, T ′〉 |= ϕ if and only
if 〈W, T ′′, T ′′〉 |= ψ for every 〈T ′′, T ′′〉 ∈ W iff W is a S5-model of ϕ iff ϕW = ⊤
iff I |= ϕW. Then, by induction in the structure of ϕ, we get that I |= ϕ iff
I |= ϕW. Finally, we have that I is a model of ϕ iff I |= ϕ and 〈W, T ′, T ′〉 |= ϕ
for every 〈T ′, T ′〉 ∈ W iff I |= ϕW and 〈W, T ′, T ′〉 |= ϕW for every 〈T ′, T ′〉 ∈ W
iff I is a model of ϕW.
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Lemma 2. Let Γ be a propositional theory and I = 〈W, H, T 〉 be some inter-
pretation. Then, I is a model of Γ iff 〈H ′, T ′〉 is a HT-model of Γ for every
HT-interpretation 〈H ′, T ′〉 ∈W ∪ {〈H,T 〉}. ⊓⊔
Proof. By definition, we have that I is a model of Γ iff I is a model of ϕ for all
ϕ ∈ Γ . Furthermore, I is a model of ϕ iff I |= ϕ and 〈W, H ′, T ′〉 |= ϕ for every
〈H ′, T ′〉 ∈ W iff 〈W, H ′, T ′〉 |= ϕ for every HT-interpretation 〈H ′, T ′〉 ∈ W ∪
{〈H,T 〉}. Finally, since ϕ is a propositional formula, we have that 〈W, H ′, T ′〉 |=
ϕ iff 〈H ′, T ′〉 |= ϕ. Hence, I is a model of Γ iff 〈H ′, T ′〉 is a HT-model of Γ for
every HT-interpretation 〈H ′, T ′〉 ∈W ∪ {〈H,T 〉}. ⊓⊔
Lemma 3. Let Γ be a propositional theory and I = 〈W, T 〉 be some total in-
terpretation. Then, I is a equilibrium model of Γ iff T ′ is an equilibrium model
of Γ for every T ′ ∈W ∪ {T }. ⊓⊔
Proof. First note that, since Γ is propositional, I is a model of Γ iff T ′ is an
model of Γ for every T ′ ∈ W ∪ {T }. Hence, we have that I is a equilibrium
model of Γ iff there is not model I ′ = 〈W′, H, T 〉 of Γ such that I ′ ≺ I.
Suppose, for the sake of contradiction, that there is some T ′ ∈W∪{T } which
is not an equilibrium model of Γ . Then, there is 〈H ′, T ′〉 |= Γ such that H ′ ⊂ T ′.
Let I ′ = 〈W, H ′, T ′〉 if T ′ = T and I ′ = 〈W′, T ′, T ′〉 with W′ = {〈H ′, T ′〉} ∪W
otherwise. Then, I ′ ≺ I and, from Lemma 3, we have that I ′ is a model of Γ
which is a contradiction. Hence, T ′ must be an equilibrium model of Γ for every
T ′ ∈W ∪ {T }. The other way around. Assume that T ′ is an equilibrium model
of Γ for every T ′ ∈ W ∪ {T } and suppose, for the sake of contradiction, that I
is not a equilibrium model of Γ . Then, there is some model I ′ = 〈W′, H, T 〉 of
Γ such that I ′ ≺ I. Then, from Lemma 3, we have that 〈H ′, T ′〉 |= Γ for every
〈H ′, T ′〉 ∈W ∪ {〈H,T 〉}. This implies that T ′ is not an equilibrium model of Γ
which is a contradiction. Consequently, I must be a equilibrium model of Γ . ⊓⊔
Theorem 5. Given a theory Γ and some S5-interpretation W, we have that W
is a weak autoepistemic world view of Γ iff W is a G91-world view of Γ . ⊓⊔
Proof. It is easy to see Definition 11 can be rewritten as the following fixpoint
equation:
W = { T | (W, T ) ∈WEQ[Γ ] }
where WEQ[Γ ] denotes the set of all weak equilibrium models of Γ . Furthermore,
from Lemmas 1 and 3, we have that 〈W, T 〉 ∈ WEQ[Γ ] iff 〈W, T 〉 ∈ WEQ[ΓW]
iff W ∪ {T } ⊆ EQ[ΓW] and, therefore, the above can be rewriting as
W = { T | W ∪ {T } ⊆ EQ[ΓW] }
which holds iff W = EQ[ΓW]. That is, iff W is a G91-world view of Γ . ⊓⊔
Note that weak autoepistemic world views are very similar to epistemic views
as defined in [25] and, in fact, we conjecture that they coincide for any theory
without nested implications. On the other hand, the following example shows
that this does not hold in general:
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Example 12. Consider the singleton theory Γ = {¬¬a ∧Kϕ → a} with ϕ the
following formula ϕ = ¬¬a → a. Then, W = [∅, {a}] is both a G91 and au-
toepistemic world view of Γ , but not an epistemic view. To see that W is both
a G91-world view of Γ , note that ΓW = {¬¬a ∧ ⊤ → a} ≡ {¬¬a → a} which
has two stable models: ∅ and {a}. Hence, W is a G91-world view of Γ . Further-
more, from Theorem 5 this implies that W is also an autoepistemic world view.
On the other hand, W is not an epistemic view because 〈W, ∅, {a}〉 is a model
of Γ in the sense of [25]. Note that 〈W, ∅, {a}〉 6|= ϕ and that both ∅ and {a}
belong to W. This implies that 〈W, ∅, {a}〉 6|= Kϕ and, thus, that 〈W, ∅, {a}〉 is
a model of Γ . On the other hand, in our logic 〈W, ∅, {a}〉 6|= ϕ does not imply
〈W, ∅, {a}〉 6|= Kϕ. In fact 〈W, ∅, {a}〉 |= Kϕ holds because both 〈W, ∅, ∅〉 |= ϕ
and 〈W, {a}, {a}〉 |= ϕ hold. ⊓⊔
This example shows that epistemic views [25] are different from G91-world
views as defined in [24] and from ours weak autoepistemic world views.
Proof of Theorem 3. From Proposition 5, we have that every autoepistemic
world view is also a weak autoepistemic world view and, from Theorem 5, this
implies that every autoepistemic world view is also a G91-world view. ⊓⊔
D Proof of the Main Theorem
First note that, by taking together Theorems 2 and 3, we immediately obtain
the following result:
Corollary 2. Any autoepistemic world view W of any program Π is also an
unfounded-free G91-world view. ⊓⊔
The converse of Corollary 2 is proved in two steps. We first prove that every
unfounded-free S5-model is also an S5-equilibrium model and then that every
S5-equilibrium model which is also a weak autoepistemic world view is an au-
toepistemic world view. As a Corollary, we obtain that every unfounded-free
G91-world view is also an autoepistemic world view.
Theorem 6. Given any program Π and some S5-interpretation W, we have
that W is an S5-equilibrium model iff W is an unfounded-free S5-model. ⊓⊔
Proof. First note that from Theorem 4, we have that any S5-equilibrium model
of any program Π is unfounded-free. Suppose now, for the sake of contradiction,
that W is an S5-model of Π but not an S5-equilibrium model. Then, there is
some S5HT-model W
′ of Π such that W′ ≺W. Let us define
S
def=
{
〈X, I〉
∣
∣ 〈H, I〉 ∈W′ with X = I \H and X 6= ∅
}
Then, is clear that, for every 〈X, I〉 ∈ S we have I ∈W′ and X ∩ I 6= ∅. Hence,
since W is unfounded-free, it follows that S cannot be an unfounded-witness for
Π w.r.t. W′. Besides, since W′ ≺ W, we have that S 6= ∅ and, thus, there must
be some 〈X, I〉 ∈ S, atom a ∈ X and rule r ∈ Π with a ∈ Head(r) satisfying all
the following conditions:
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1. (W, I) |=
∧
Body(r), and
2. Body+ob(r) ∩X = ∅, and
3. (Head(r) \X) ∩ I = ∅.
4. Body+sub(r) ∩ Y = ∅, and
Furthermore, since W′ is an S5HT-model of Π , we have that (W
′, H, I) |= r for
every r ∈ Π and with H = I \X and that one of the following must hold:
5. (W, I) 6|=
∧
Body(r), or
6. (W′, H, I) |=
∨
Head(r), or
7. (W′, H, I) 6|=
∧
Body(r) and (W, I) |=
∨
Head(r).
Clearly, (5) is in contradiction with (1) and, thus, either (6) or (7) must hold.
Note also that (3) implies that Head(r) ∩ H = ∅ and, thus, (6) cannot hold
either. In more detail, we have that
(Head(r) \X) ∩ I = ∅ holds
iff (Head(r) \ (I \H)) ∩ I = ∅
iff (Head(r) ∩ (I ∩H)) ∩ I = ∅
iff (Head(r) ∩ (I ∪H)) ∩ I = ∅
iff Head(r) ∩ I ∩ I = ∅ and Head(r) ∩H ∩ I = ∅
iff Head(r) ∩H ∩ I = ∅
iff Head(r) ∩H = ∅
iff (W′, H, I) 6|=
∨
Head(r) Hence, (7) must hold and, thus, there is some literal
L ∈ Body+(r) such that (W′, H, I) 6|= L. If L ∈ Bodyobj(r), then, we have that
L /∈ H . Besides, from condition 1, we have that L ∈ I and, thus, L ∈ I \H = X
which is a contradiction with condition 2. Otherwise, L ∈ Bodysub(r) and we
have that there is 〈H ′, I ′〉 ∈ W′ such that a /∈ H ′ with L = K a. But then,
〈X ′, I ′〉 ∈ S with X ′ = I ′ \ H ′ and, thus, a ∈ Y which is a contradiction with
condition 4. Consequently, W is an S5-equilibrium model. ⊓⊔
Lemma 4. Let Γ be a theory, W be an S5-equilibrium model of Γ and T ∈ W
be a propositional interpretation. If 〈W, T 〉 is a weak equilibrium model of Γ ,
then 〈W, T 〉 is also a equilibrium model of Γ .
Proof. Suppose that 〈W, T 〉 is not a equilibrium model of Γ . Since 〈W, T 〉 is a
weak equilibrium model of Γ , we have that (W, T ) is model of Γ and, thus, there
must be some non-semi-total model I ′ = 〈W′, H, T 〉 of Γ such that I ′ ≺ (W, T ).
Hence, there is 〈H ′, T ′〉 ∈W′ with H ⊂ T . This implies that W′ ≺W and, since
W is an S5-equilibrium model of Γ , that W is not a S5HT-model of Γ . Hence,
W′ is not a S5HT-model of Γ . This implies that there is some formula ϕ ∈ Γ
and HT-interpretation 〈H ′′, T ′′〉 ∈ W′ such that 〈W′, H ′′, T ′′〉 6|= ϕ. In its turn,
this implies that I ′ is not a model of Γ which is a contradiction. Consequently,
〈W, T 〉 is a equilibrium model of Γ . ⊓⊔
Proposition 6. Given a theory Γ and an S5-interpretation W, we have that W
is an autoepistemic world view iff W is both an S5-equilibrium model and a weak
autoepistemic world view of Γ . ⊓⊔
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Proof. First note that from Corollary 1 and Proposition 5, we have that every
autoepistemic world view is both an S5-equilibrium model and a weak autoepis-
temic world view of Γ . The other way around. Since W is a weak autoepistemic
equilibrium model of Γ , we have that 〈W, T 〉 is a weak equilibrium model of Γ for
every T ∈W which, from Lemma ??, implies that 〈W, T 〉 is a equilibrium model
of Γ for every T ∈ W. Hence, it only remains to be shown that the following
condition hold:
there is no propositional interpretation T such that model 〈W, T 〉 is an
equilibrium model of Γ and T /∈W.
Suppose, for the sake of contradiction, that there is some propositional inter-
pretation T such that model 〈W, T 〉 is an equilibrium model of Γ and T /∈ W.
First, this implies that 〈W, T 〉 is an D45-model of Γ . Then, since W is a weak
autoepistemic equilibrium model of Γ and T /∈W, it follows that 〈W, T 〉 cannot
be a weak equilibrium model of Γ and, thus, there is some semi-total model J is
a model of Γ such that J ≺ 〈W, T 〉. But every semi-total model is also a model,
so this is a contradiction with the fact that 〈W, T 〉 is a equilibrium model of Γ .
Consequently, W must be an autoepistemic world view of Γ . ⊓⊔
Corollary 3. Given any program Π and some S5-interpretation W, we have
that W is an autoepistemic world view of Π iff W is an unfounded-free weak
autoepistemic world view. ⊓⊔
Proof. From Proposition 6 and Theorem 6, we have that W is an autoepistemic
world view iff W is both an S5-equilibrium model and a weak autoepistemic
world view iff W is an unfounded-free S5-model and a weak autoepistemic world
view. Finally, it is easy to see that every weak autoepistemic world view is also
an S5-model and, thus, we get that any S5-interpretation is an autoepistemic
world view iff is an unfounded-free weak autoepistemic world view. ⊓⊔
Proof of the Main Theorem. Let W be any S5-interpretation. Then, from
Corollary 3, we have thatW is an autoepistemic world view iffW is an unfounded-
free weak autoepistemic world view. Furthermore, from Theorem 5, we have that
W is a weak autoepistemic world view iff W is a G91-world view. Taking these
two facts together, we get that W is an autoepistemic world view iff W is an
unfounded-free G91-world view. ⊓⊔
E Proofs of Propositions 2 and 3
Proposition 7. Let ϕ be a formula and let 〈W, H, T 〉 be an interpretation.
Then, 〈W, H, T 〉 |= ¬ϕ iff 〈Wt, T, T 〉 6|= ϕ iff 〈Wt, T, T 〉 |= ¬ϕ. ⊓⊔
Proof. By definition, we have that 〈Wt, T, T 〉 |= ¬ϕ iff 〈Wt, T, T 〉 |= ϕ → ⊥
iff 〈Wt, T, T 〉 6|= ϕ. Furthermore, by definition, we have that 〈W, H, T 〉 |= ¬ϕ
iff both 〈W, H, T 〉 6|= ϕ and 〈W, T, T 〉 6|= ϕ. Finally, since Proposition ??, we
have that 〈W, H, T 〉 |= ϕ implies 〈W, T, T 〉 |= ϕ we get that 〈W, H, T 〉 |= ¬ϕ iff
〈W, T, T 〉 6|= ϕ. ⊓⊔
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Lemma 5. Let ϕ be a formula where all occurrences of K are in the scope
of negation and let 〈W, H, T 〉 be an interpretation. Then, 〈W, H, T 〉 |= ϕ iff
〈Wt, H, T 〉 |= ϕ. ⊓⊔
Proof. In case that ϕ ∈ AT is an atom, we have that 〈W, H, T 〉 |= ϕ iff ϕ ∈ H iff
〈Wt, H, T 〉 |= ϕ. In case ϕ = ¬ψ, from Proposition 7, we have that 〈W, H, T 〉 |= ϕ
iff 〈Wt, T, T 〉 |= ϕ iff 〈Wt, H, T 〉 |= ϕ. Otherwise, the proof follows by induction
in the structure of the formula. ⊓⊔
Lemma 6. Let Γ be a formula where all occurrences of K are in the scope of
negation and let W be a weak autoepistemic world view. Then, W is also an
autoepistemic world view. ⊓⊔
Proof. Since W be a weak autoepistemic world view we have that
1. (W, T ) is a weak equilibrium model of Γ for every T ∈W, and
2. there not exists any propositional interpretation T such that 〈W, T 〉 is a
weak equilibrium model of Γ and T /∈W.
First note that condition 2 immediately implies that there not exists any proposi-
tional interpretation T such that 〈W, T 〉 is a equilibrium model of Γ and T /∈W.
Suppose now, for the sake of contradiction, that
there is T ∈W such that (W, T ) is a not equilibrium model of Γ .
Hence, there is a non-semi-total model I = (W′, H, T ) of Γ s.t. I ≺ (W, T ).
Furthermore, since I is a model of Γ , we have that (W′, H ′, T ′) |= ϕ all ϕ ∈ Γ
and all 〈H ′, T ′〉 ∈ W ∪ {〈H,T 〉} which, from Lemma 5 and the fact that all
occurrences of K in ϕ are in the scope of negation, implies that (W, H ′, T ′) |= ϕ
holds for all ϕ ∈ Γ and all 〈H ′, T ′〉 ∈W∪{〈H,T 〉}. Note that, since I ≺ (W, T ),
there is 〈H ′′, T ′′〉 ∈W′ ∪ {〈H,T 〉} with H ′′ ⊂ T ′′ and we have that (W, H ′′, T ′′)
is a semi-total model of Γ and that (W, H ′′, T ′′) ≺ (W, T ′′). Note also that
〈H ′′, T ′′〉 ∈ W′ implies T ′′ ∈ W and, thus, the above is a contradiction with
condition 1. Hence, we have that (W, T ) is a equilibrium model of Γ for every
T ∈W. Consequently, W is an autoepistemic world view. ⊓⊔
Proof of Proposition 2. From Proposition 5, we have that every autoepis-
temic world view W of any theory Γ is also a weak autoepistemic world view.
Furthermore, since all occurrences of K in Γ are in the scope of negation, from
Lemma 6, the converse also holds. ⊓⊔
Lemma 7. Let ϕ be a formula in which every atom is in the scope of the modal
operator K and I = 〈W, H, T 〉 be some interpretation. Then, I |= ϕ iff Wt is
an S5-model of ϕ.
Proof. In case ϕ = Kψ, we have that I |= ϕ iff 〈W, H ′, T ′〉 |= ψ for all
〈H ′, T ′〉 ∈W iff W is an S5HT-model of ϕ. The rest of the proof follows by
induction on the structure of ϕ. ⊓⊔
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Lemma 8. Let ϕ be a formula in which every atom is in the scope of the modal
operator K and I = 〈W, H, T 〉 be some interpretation. Then, I is a model of
⊥ ← ϕ iff Wt is an S5-model of ⊥ ← ϕ.
Proof. By definition, we have that I is a model of ⊥ ← ϕ
iff 〈W, H ′, T ′〉 |= ⊥ ← ϕ for all 〈H ′, T ′〉 ∈W ∪ {〈H,T 〉}
iff 〈Wt, T ′, T ′〉 6|= ϕ for all 〈H ′, T ′〉 ∈W ∪ {〈H,T 〉}
iff Wt is not an S5HT-model of ϕ (Lemma 7)
iff Wt is an S5HT-model of ⊥ ← ϕ
iff Wt is an S5-model of ⊥ ← ϕ. ⊓⊔
Lemma 9. Let Γ be a theory and ϕ be a formula in which every atom is in the
scope of the modal operator K and I = 〈W, H, T 〉 be some interpretation. Then,
I is a equilibrium model of Γ ∪ {⊥ ← ϕ} iff I is a equilibrium model of Γ and
W
t is an S5-model of ⊥ ← ϕ.
Proof. Assume first that I is a equilibrium model of Γ ∪ {⊥ ← ϕ}. Then, I is
a model of Γ and a model of ⊥ ← ϕ. From Lemma 8, the latter implies that
Wt is an S5-model of ⊥ ← ϕ. Suppose, for the sake of contradiction, that I is
a equilibrium model of Γ and, thus, that there is some model I ′ = 〈W′, H ′, T ′〉
of Γ such that I ′ ≺ I. Then, I ′ ≺ I implies that (W′)t = W and, thus, from
Lemma 8 and the fact that Wt is an S5-model of ⊥ ← ϕ, it follows that J is a
model of ⊥ ← ϕ which is a contradiction with the fact that I is a equilibrium
model of Γ ∪ {⊥ ← ϕ}.
The other way around. Assume that I is a equilibrium model of Γ and Wt
is an S5-model of ⊥ ← ϕ. From Lemma 8, we have that I is a model of ⊥ ← ϕ
and, thus, a equilibrium model of Γ ∪ {⊥ ← ϕ}. ⊓⊔
Proof of Proposition 3. For Property ??, note that since we are dealing with
propositional theories there is no occurrence ofK and, thus, we can apply Propo-
sition 2 and Theorem 5 to see that the autoepistemic and G91 world views co-
incide. Then, just note that, since there is no occurrence of K, we have that
ΓW = Γ and, thus W is an autoepistemic world view of Γ iff W is a G91-world
view of Γ iff W = SM[ΓW] = SM[Γ ].
For Property ??, from Corollary 1, it follows that every autoepistemic world
view W is also an S5-equilibrium model and it is easy to check that every
S5-equilibrium model is also an S5-model.
For Property ??, we have that W is an autoepistemic world view of Γ ∪{⊥ ← ϕ}
iff the following equality holds:
W = { T | (W, T ) ∈ EQB[Γ ∪ {⊥ ← ϕ}] }
Furthermore, from Lemma 9 and the fact that every atom in ϕ is in the scope of
the modal operator K, it follows that (W, T ) ∈ EQB[Γ ∪ {⊥ ← ϕ}] iff (W, T ) ∈
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EQB[Γ ] andW is S5-model of ⊥ ← ϕ. Hence, we have thatW is an autoepistemic
world view of Γ ∪ {⊥ ← ϕ} iff the following equality holds:
W = { T | (W, T ) ∈ EQB[Γ ] }
and W is S5-model of ⊥ ← ϕ. ⊓⊔
